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THE REAL GREEN ISSUE REGARDING
RECREATIONAL MARIJUANA: FEDERAL TAX
AND BANKING LAWS IN NEED OF REFORM
INTRODUCTION
Less than ten years ago, the United States Supreme Court held that
the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution permits Con-
gress to regulate the cultivation and use of medicinal marijuana.1  Af-
ter the Supreme Court’s decision, many states have decriminalized
and legalized the use and cultivation of medical marijuana in clear
violation of federal law.2  Receiving minimal repercussions for contra-
vening the law of the land, Colorado3 and Washington4 took defiance
one step further by extending legalization not only to medical mari-
juana, but also to small amounts of recreational marijuana.5  Though
many predicted an aggressive response by the federal government, on
August 29, 2013, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ)
shocked Americans by advising prosecutors to exercise discretion in
pursuing marijuana trafficking, reasoning that prosecutors should use
the operation of state law to determine whether unlawful conduct af-
fects several specified federal enforcement policies due to limited
resources.6
1. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005).
2. 23 Legal Medical Marijuana States and DC, PROCON.ORG, http://medicalmarijuana.procon
.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000881 (last updated Jan. 8, 2015, 2:50 PM) (listing Alaska
(1998), Arizona (2010), California (1996), Colorado (2000), Connecticut (2012), Delaware
(2011), District of Columbia (2012), Hawaii (2000), Illinois (2013), Maine (1999), Maryland
(2014), Massachusetts (2012), Michigan (2008), Minnesota (2014), Montana (2004), Nevada
(2000), New Hampshire (2013), New Jersey (2010), New Mexico (2007), New York (2014), Ore-
gon (1998), Rhode Island (2006), Vermont (2004), and Washington (1998)).
3. COLO. CONST. art. 18, § 16.
4. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 69.50.360(3), 69.50.401(3) (2014).
5. Evan Perez, No Federal Challenge to Pot Legalization in Two States, CNN, http://www.cnn
.com/2013/08/29/politics/holder-marijuana-laws (last updated Aug. 30, 2013, 6:36 AM).  Two
other states, Oregon and Alaska, have also legalized recreational marijuana since this Comment
was written. See State Marijuana Laws Map, GOVERNING: THE STATES & LOCALITIES, http://
www.governing.com/gov-data/state-marijuana-laws-map-medical-recreational.html (last updated
Apr. 17, 2015).
6. Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, on Guidance
Regarding Marijuana Enforcement (Aug. 29, 2013) [hereinafter Cole Memorandum], available
at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf; see also infra notes
64–70 and accompanying text.
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Despite the ostensible green light to business owners endeavoring
to sell recreational marijuana, the government has failed to provide
federal assistance in the areas of federal banking and tax laws to aid
states like Colorado and Washington in their “legalization experi-
ments.”7  The lack of access to banking services, according to the dep-
uty director of the National Cannabis Industry Association, is the
single most dangerous thing about the legal sale of marijuana.8  More-
over, according to the marijuana industry’s principal publication, the
inability to deduct business expenses from a seller’s federal income
tax is the largest threat to the success of marijuana businesses and
risks pushing the entire industry underground.9
The importation, distribution, cultivation, and sale of marijuana
were federally taxed at prohibitive levels in 193710 and prohibited out-
right in 1970.11  In the Controlled Substances Act of 1970 (CSA), Con-
gress classified marijuana as a Schedule I substance, the most severely
restricted category out of five distinct categories used to classify a
drug depending on its accepted medical use and its abuse or depen-
dency potential.12
Though the CSA’s bottom-line marijuana prohibition is still the law
of this country, the federal government has adopted a strategy of non-
enforcement concerning recreational marijuana, which was formalized
in the DOJ’s 2013 Memorandum from James M. Cole, the U.S. Dep-
uty Attorney General (Cole Memorandum).  The Cole Memorandum
updates its prior guidance in light of state initiatives that legalize the
7. Cf. Jon Walker, 6 Things Obama Could Do To Help the Pot Legalization Experiment, JUST-
SAYNOW (Jan. 21, 2014, 10:51 AM), http://justsaynow.firedoglake.com/2014/01/21/six-things-
obama-could-to-help-the-pot-legalization-experiment-go-forward/.
8. Matt Ferner, Marijuana Businesses Should Have Access to Federal Banking System: Denver
City Council, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 7, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/01/07/mari-
juana-banking_n_4555586.html.
9. Marijuana Business Conference Wrapup: 36 Tips, Lessons & Takeaways for the Cannabis
Industry, MED. MARIJUANA BUS. DAILY (Nov. 15, 2012), http://mmjbusinessdaily.com/mari-
juana-business-conference-wrapup-36-tips-lessons-take-aways-for-the-cannabis-industry/.
10. RUDOLPH J. GERBER, LEGALIZING MARIJUANA: DRUG POLICY REFORM AND PROHIBI-
TION POLITICS 2–16 (2004).
11. Alex Kreit, Comment, The Future of Medical Marijuana: Should the States Grow Their
Own, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1787, 1793–94 (2003) (“While effectively eliminated, medical use and
distribution was still technically allowed under the Marihuana Tax Act until the passage of the
Controlled Substances Act in 1970.”).
12. See Controlled Substances Act (CSA), 21 U.S.C. § 811; see also Robert A. Mikos, On the
Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana and the States’ Overlooked Power To Legalize Federal
Crime, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1421, 1434–35 (2009); 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1) (2012); Jack Park,
Obama’s DOJ (Again) Limits Enforcement of Federal Marijuana Law, EXECUTIVE BRANCH
PROJECT (Sept. 13, 2013), http://executivebranchproject.com/obamas-doj-again-limits-enforce-
ment-of-federal-marijuana-law/; Drug Schedules, U.S. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., http://www
.dea.gov/druginfo/ds.shtml (last visited June 20, 2015).
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possession of small amounts of marijuana and provide for the regula-
tion of marijuana production, processing, and sale.13  Instead of prose-
cuting in compliance with the CSA, the Cole Memorandum instructs
federal prosecutors to focus enforcement efforts on certain specified
priorities, relying on the states that have enacted laws authorizing the
sale of recreational marijuana to implement strong and effective regu-
latory systems.14
Although the Obama Administration is affording states leeway to
experiment with recreational marijuana legalization in response to the
national movement for relaxed marijuana laws,15 such latitude is con-
ditioned on states, such as Washington and Colorado, implementing
regulatory systems in compliance with the Cole Memorandum.16
However, the DOJ and the Obama Administration fail to realize that
federal banking and tax laws will likely make this endeavor an impos-
sibility.  The implications of the Obama Administration’s failure to
amend current banking and tax regulations is the equivalent of actu-
ally enforcing the CSA; therefore, there is no feasible way for states to
comply with the DOJ’s stated objectives in the Cole Memorandum.
Under the CSA, any bank that takes money from an illegal enter-
prise may lose its Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) cov-
erage and be prosecuted.17  Consequently, states are left to figure out
how cash generated from marijuana cultivation and sales can be de-
posited into banks without violating federal money-laundering laws.
Without access to banking services, marijuana businesses are required
to hold onto large amounts of cash, making them vulnerable to theft
and difficult to regulate.  Additionally, legal marijuana businesses
13. Cole Memorandum, supra note 6, at 1.
14. Id. at 2.
15. David Ingram, U.S. Allows States To Legalize Recreational Marijuana Within Limits,
REUTERS (Aug. 29, 2013, 7:01 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/29/us-usa-crime-mari-
juana-idUSBRE97S0YW20130829.
The Justice Department could have sued to block the Colorado and Washington laws
from taking effect under the theory that they conflict with the [CSA] . . . .
Coupled with the decision not to sue, the [DOJ] sent a four-page memorandum to
federal prosecutors nationwide outlining eight priority areas for marijuana
enforcement.
Id.
16. Cole Memorandom, supra note 6, at 2–3 (“A system adequate to that task must not only
contain robust controls and procedures on paper; it must also be effective in practice.  Jurisdic-
tions that have implemented systems that provide for regulation of marijuana activity must pro-
vide the necessary resources . . . to enforce their laws [without] undermin[ing] federal
enforcement priorities.”).
17. Maggie Clark, States with Legal Marijuana Ask Feds To Update Banking Regulations,
GOVERNING (Sept. 13, 2013), http://www.governing.com/news/state/sl-legal-marijuana-states-
ask-congress-for-banking-changes.html.
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without bank accounts are assessed a 10% penalty for paying federal
payroll taxes in cash.18  This tax penalty, however, seems minimal in
comparison to the Federal Income Tax Code’s § 280E, which prevents
traffickers of controlled substances from receiving deductions for any
expenses beyond the cost of producing or buying inventory.19  Al-
though income derived from marijuana sales is taxable, taxpayers en-
gaged in marijuana sales are unable to deduct ordinary and necessary
business expenses due to marijuana’s Schedule I status.20
This Comment argues that if the federal government refuses to en-
force the CSA and instead allows states to offer for sale recreational
marijuana, it must reform the banking and tax laws that hamper the
creation of legitimate businesses.  First, in the area of banking, Con-
gress should enact legislation allowing banks to offer financial services
without fear of prosecution; anything less leaves financial institutions
subject to prosecution, and continues the status quo that forces other-
wise law-abiding businesses to operate on a cash-only basis.  First, in
the area of tax the IRS should suspend the penalty that marijuana
businesses are assessed for paying employee-withholding taxes in cash
until the banking issue is resolved.  Second, and most importantly,
Congress should exempt state-licensed marijuana businesses from
§ 280E, enabling owners to deduct necessary and ordinary business
expenses from their federal income taxes.
This Comment proceeds as follows: Part II (1) provides a brief legal
history of marijuana in the United States;21 (2) describes state action
to legalize marijuana for medical use and the federal government’s
response;22 (3) explains the structure of newly enacted state recrea-
tional marijuana laws;23 and (4) describes the relevant banking and tax
18. David Migoya, IRS Fines Unbanked Pot Shops for Paying Federal Payroll Tax in Cash,
DENVER POST (July 2, 2014, 11:17 PM), http://www.denverpost.com/business/ci_26075425/irs-
fines-unbanked-pot-shops-paying-federal-payroll.
19. 26 U.S.C. § 280E (2012).
No deduction or credit shall be allowed for any amount paid or incurred during the
taxable year in carrying on any trade or business if such trade or business (or other
activities which comprise such trade or business) consists of trafficking in controlled
substances (within the meaning of schedule I and II of the Controlled Substances Act)
which is prohibited by Federal law or the law of any State in which such trade or busi-
ness is conducted.
Id.
20. Pat Oglesby, Marijuana Advertising: The Federal Tax Stalemate, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct.
25, 2013, 5:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/pat-oglesby/marijuana-advertising-
the_b_3810341.html.
21. See infra notes 27–34 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 35–63 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 64–96 and accompanying text.
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laws that impede effective regulation.24  Part III of this Comment ana-
lyzes how Congress can reform federal banking and tax laws to foster
the creation of legitimate businesses.25  Part IV explains how the suc-
cess of states like Colorado and Washington in implementing regula-
tory systems will have a dramatic impact on whether more states move
to legalize recreational marijuana use.26
II. BACKGROUND
A. Brief History of Marijuana’s Legal Status
Although the Obama Administration has embraced a relaxed
prosecutorial approach to both medicinal and recreational marijuana
users,27 the use of marijuana in the United States is illegal under fed-
eral law.28  The Controlled Substances Act (CSA) was enacted in 1970
and prohibits the cultivation, possession, sale, or distribution of mari-
juana and its derivatives.29  The CSA does not distinguish between
medicinal and recreational uses of marijuana, and lawmakers have re-
jected campaigns to reschedule marijuana from Schedule I to a lesser
class and have refused to carve out exceptions regarding marijuana
users.30  Although one might honestly be unaware of marijuana’s legal
status due to the wave of legalization in the states, violation of the
federal prohibition continues to carry with it the possibility of signifi-
cant criminal penalties.31
Drug policy reformers began promoting marijuana legalization by
stressing marijuana’s potential medical benefits.32  In 1972, the Na-
24. See infra notes 98–139 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 140–224 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 225–254 and accompanying text.
27. See Cole Memorandum, supra note 6.
28. 21 U.S.C. §§ 811–812, 814 (2012).
29. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (Controlled Substances
Act or CSA), Pub. L. No. 91-513, tit. II, 84 Stat. 1236, 1242–84 (1970) (codified as amended at 21
U.S.C. §§ 801–904 (2000)).
30. Robert Mikos, A Critical Appraisal of the Department of Justice’s New Approach to Medi-
cal Marijuana, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 633, 1434 –35 (2001); see also United States v. Oakland
Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 491 (2001).  If marijuana were rescheduled from a Sched-
ule I substance to a Schedule II substance, medical use would be permissible because Schedule II
substances are approved for medical use despite having a high potential for abuse. See 21 U.S.C.
§§ 812(b)(1), 812(b)(2) (2012); see also Melanie Reid, The Quagmire That Nobody in the Federal
Government Wants To Talk About: Marijuana, 44 N.M. L. REV. 169, 191–92 (2014).
31. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(D).  For example, possession with the intent to distribute, manufac-
ture, or distribution of any amount of marijuana constitutes a felony, carrying a maximum sen-
tence of five years imprisonment and a maximum fine of $250,000 for individuals and $1 million
for entities. Id.
32. See LESTER GRINSPOON & JAMES B. BAKALAR, MARIHUANA, THE FORBIDDEN MEDICINE
13 (rev. & expanded ed. 1997).
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tional Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML)
filed an administrative action seeking to remove marijuana from the
CSA entirely, or in the alternative, assign it to a lesser schedule.33
Despite extensive hearings, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency
(DEA) eventually prevailed,34 and marijuana remained a Schedule I
substance.  The federal government’s position rejecting a national
medical marijuana regime remained unwavering, which forced propo-
nents of medical marijuana to seek new forums to challenge the fed-
eral ban.
B. State Action To Legalize Medical Marijuana and the
Federal Government’s Response
Reform advocates struggled with challenging federal drug laws due
to marijuana’s illegal status as a Schedule I drug under the CSA.35
Consequently, marijuana reform activists adopted new strategies by
which they instead utilized the voter proposition process.36  Such mea-
sures have been employed since the early 1990s with regard to medici-
nal marijuana use, and continue to be employed today as an avenue to
legalize recreational marijuana use.37
In 1996, advocates placed initiatives on the ballot in California and
Arizona to decriminalize medical marijuana under state law.38
Though the initiatives passed in both states, Arizona’s Proposition 200
was never enacted due to a language technicality in the statute.39 Cali-
33. Nat’l Org. for the Reform of Marijuana Laws v. DEA, 559 F.2d 735, 741–43 (D.C. Cir.
1977).  The petition sought to reclassify marijuana as a Schedule V drug, the least restrictive
class, consisting of drugs with a low potential for abuse and that are currently accepted for medi-
cal use. Id. at 741.
34. Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics v. DEA, 15 F.3d 1131, 1137 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (denying
a petition to review an order rejecting the assignment of marijuana as a Schedule II drug under
the CSA).
35. See Kreit, supra note 11, at 1788–89.
36. Id.
37. See K.K. DuVivier, State Ballot Initiatives in the Federal Preemption Equation: A Medical
Marijuana Case Study, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 221, 284 (2005); David Blake & Jack Finlaw,
Marijuana Legalization in Colorado: Learned Lessons, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 359, 359
(2014).
38. See Brooke Mascagni, The Politics of Exclusion in California’s Marijuana Reform Move-
ment, 15 UDC/DCSL L. REV. 33, 36 (2011) (discussing marijuana legalization via state initiatives
and direct-democracy campaigns).
39. Kreit, supra note 11, at 1796–97; see also Elvia Diaz, Medical Marijuana Debate Flares,
ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Oct. 20, 2002, at 7B.  Proposition 200 “allowed physicians to prescribe Sched-
ule I drugs ‘to treat a disease, or to relieve the pain and suffering of a seriously ill patient or
terminally ill patient.’”  Michael Berkey, Note, Mary Jane’s New Dance: The Medical Marijuana
Tango, 9 CARDOZO PUB. L., POL’Y & ETHICS J. 417, 429 (2011); see also Drug Medicalization,
Prevention, and Control Act of 1996, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3412.01(A) (West 2010).
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fornia’s Compassionate Use Act, however, passed by 56% of the vote,
making it the first state to legalize medical marijuana.40
In order to combat these voter initiatives, the Office of National
Drug Control Policy developed a coordinated administrative strategy
with federal agencies to minimize drug abuse.41  Accordingly, the De-
partment of Justice (DOJ) and the Department of Health and Human
Services targeted doctors by threatening to revoke DEA registrations
and withhold Medicare and Medicaid reimbursements to any physi-
cian who recommended or prescribed marijuana.42  However, the
Ninth Circuit upheld a district court ruling in favor of the doctors, and
enjoined the federal government from either revoking a physician’s
license to prescribe controlled substances or conducting an investiga-
tion of a recommending physician that might lead to such
revocation.43
The campaign against medical marijuana continued throughout the
George W. Bush Administration, during which the U.S. Attorney’s
Office prosecuted high-profile medical marijuana suppliers.44   The
DEA specifically targeted medical dispensaries, conducting over 200
raids in California alone.45  The DEA also warned landlords that their
property would be seized if they failed to evict marijuana-dispensing
tenants.46
Consequently, proponents of medical marijuana sought protection
from the federal courts.  However, the Supreme Court in Gonzales v.
Raich47 firmly upheld marijuana’s prohibition, and held that Congress
has the power to regulate even intrastate cultivation and consumption
of marijuana.48  Further, in United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’
Cooperative,49 the Supreme Court refused to allow medical marijuana
dispensaries to escape liability by using a medical-necessity defense.50
40. See Laura P. Gouldin, Cannabis, Compassionate Use and the Commerce Clause: Why De-
velopments in California May Limit the Constitutional Reach of the Federal Drug Laws, 1999
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 471, 481.
41. Statement from Barry R. McCaffrey, Dir., Office of Nat’l Drug Control Policy: The Ad-
ministration’s Response to Passage of California Proposition 215 and Arizona Proposition 200,
at 1 (Dec. 30, 1996), available at http://www.drugpolicy.org/docuploads/ondcp1296.pdf.
42. Berkey, supra note 39, at 429–30.
43. Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 632 (9th Cir. 2002).
44. See, e.g., Bob Egelko, Pot Advocate Gets 1 Day in Jail and Gives Judge a Piece of His
Mind, S.F. CHRON., July 7, 2007, at B3.
45. Mikos, supra note 30, at 638.
46. See id.; see also Wyatt Buchanan, Pot Dispensaries Shut in Response to Federal Threat, S.F.
CHRON., Feb. 7, 2008, at B1.
47. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
48. Id. at 29.
49. 532 U.S. 483 (2001).
50. Id. at 491.
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Although these Supreme Court decisions reinforced the federal gov-
ernment’s power to prosecute those individuals who violated the
CSA, they did not stop, or even hinder, state legalization campaigns.51
Starting with California in 1996, twenty-three states and the District
of Columbia have legalized medical marijuana via the voter-initiative
process of state law.52  These laws remove criminal sanctions for the
medical use of marijuana, define eligibility for such use, and allow
some means of access—home cultivation or dispensaries.53  Generally,
all of the laws permit residents to possess, consume, and grow mari-
juana by obtaining a qualifying diagnosis and recommendation from a
licensed physician.54
The proliferation of legalized medical marijuana has led to an in-
crease in demand, causing the creation of medical marijuana collec-
tives and cooperatives.55   In Colorado alone, entrepreneurs have
taken advantage of the vague constitutional amendments regarding
marijuana sales and opened hundreds of medical dispensaries across
the state since Amendment 20 passed in 2001.56  Consequently, states
began to regulate dispensaries more closely, with most states requiring
that owners be primary caregivers, operate as nonprofits, acquire busi-
ness licenses and sellers’ permits, and remit sales tax.57
Notwithstanding state laws regulating medical marijuana dispensa-
ries, the DOJ has confused matters further by initially indicating leni-
ency toward such dispensaries and then calling for raids on hundreds
of dispensaries and encouraging the IRS and other federal law en-
51. See David B. Rivkin & Elizabeth Price Foley, Federal Antidrug Law Goes Up in Smoke,
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 28, 2014, 6:52 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/david-b-rivkin-jr-and-eliza-
beth-price-foley-federal-antidrug-law-goes-up-in-smoke-1419810742.
52. See sources listed supra note 2; see also Mikos, supra note 45, at 636.  Currently, there is
pending legislation to legalize medical marijuana in seven states. See Medical Marijuana,
PROCON.ORG (May 19, 2015), http://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/view.resource.php?re
sourceID=002481.
53. The Twenty-Three States and One Federal District with Effective Medical Marijuana Laws,
MARIJUANA POL’Y PROJECT, http://www.mpp.org/assets/pdfs/library/MMJLawsSummary.pdf
(last updated July 25, 2014).
54. Mikos, supra note 30, at 636.
55. Berkey, supra note 39, at 447.  Medical marijuana collectives are groups of qualified pa-
tients or caregivers that share a common interest in the production and distribution of medical
marijuana among the group.  Medical marijuana cooperatives are nonprofit organizations cre-
ated by cultivators, groups of qualified patients, or both, to distribute medical marijuana to the
group.
56. Sean T. McAllister, The New, More Regulated Frontier for Medical Marijuana, 39 COLO.
LAW. 29, 30 (2010); Sam Kamin, Medical Marijuana in Colorado and the Future of Marijuana
Regulation in the United States, 43 MCGEORGE L. REV. 147, 149 (2012).
57. See CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUIDELINES FOR THE SECURITY AND NON-DIVERSION OF
MARIJUANA 5–11 (2008).
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forcement officials to target banks and landlords that conduct business
with these distributors.58
Specifically, in 2009, the Obama Administration broke from its
predecessors and announced a new federal policy toward medical ma-
rijuana—a policy to cease DOJ enforcement of the federal ban, disre-
garding the Supreme Court’s ruling in Raich.59  The Administration’s
radical shift in federal drug policy was outlined in a 2009 DOJ memo-
randum from Deputy Attorney General David W. Ogden (2009 Mem-
orandum), which advised prosecutors to only focus attention on
“significant traffickers” of illegal narcotics, reasoning that the federal
government’s limited resources for waging the war on drugs should
not be used to target individuals complying with state laws.60
However, in 2011, just eighteen months later, the Obama Adminis-
tration’s Deputy Attorney General James M. Cole, in yet another
Memorandum (2011 Memorandum), departed from the unenforce-
ment policy due to an increase in the scope of commercial cultivation,
sale, distribution, and use of marijuana for medical purposes.61  He
reasoned that the 2009 Memorandum was never intended to shield
privately operated industrial marijuana cultivation centers from fed-
eral enforcement action or prosecution, even where those activities
purport to comply with state law.62
However, following the 2012 presidential election, President
Obama publicly retreated from enforcement of even recreational ma-
rijuana users, and remarked on the need to reconcile a federal law
that says marijuana is illegal and state laws that say it is not, adding
that “[i]t would not make sense for us to see a top priority as going
after recreational users in states that have determined that it’s le-
gal. . . . We’ve got bigger fish to fry.”63
58. Ryan Grim & Ryan J. Reilly, Obama’s Drug War: After Medical Marijuana Mess, Feds
Face Big Decision on Pot, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 8, 2013, 1:09 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost
.com/2013/01/26/obamas-drug-war-medical-marijuana_n_2546178.html.
59. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005).
60. Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, on Inves-
tigations and Prosecutions in States Authorizing the Medical Use of Marijuana (Oct. 19, 2009)
[hereinafter 2009 Memo], available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2009/
10/19/medical-marijuana.pdf.
61. Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, on Gui-
dance Regarding the Ogden Memo in Jurisdictions Seeking to Authorize Marijuana for Medical
Use 1–2 (June 29, 2011) [hereinafter 2011 Memo], available at http://www.justice.gov/oip/docs/
dag-guidance-2011-for-medical-marijuana-use.pdf.
62. Id. at 2.
63. Paul Armentano, Will Obama Go After Legal Pot in Washington and Colorado?, AL-
TERNET (Dec. 19, 2012), http://www.alternet.org/drugs/will-obama-go-after-legal-pot-washing-
ton-and-colorado (alteration in original).
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C. Structure of Newly Enacted State Recreational Marijuana Laws
The final step for state decriminalization—authorizing marijuana
for recreational use without criminal sanctions or fines—occurred in
November 2012, when Washington and Colorado became the first
states to legalize recreational marijuana through referendums.64
Nearly 55% of Colorado voters approved Amendment 64, The Regu-
late Marijuana Like Alcohol Act of 2012, authorizing possession by
adults of up to one ounce and the cultivation of up to six cannabis
plants in an enclosed, locked space.65  Likewise, Washington’s Initia-
tive 502, approved by 55.7% of voters, legalizes up to one ounce of
marijuana possession, 16 ounces of a solid product such as marijuana
cookies, or 72 ounces of marijuana infused liquid, for personal use by
adults.66
Though many perceived these state initiatives as crossing the
Obama Administration’s gray enforcement line, the DOJ’s Cole
Memorandum made clear the Administration’s decision not to block
the Colorado and Washington laws.67  The four-page letter generally
outlined eight objectives for states to incorporate when implementing
regulatory schemes, including preventing (1) the distribution of mari-
juana to minors; (2) revenue from the sale of marijuana going to crim-
inal enterprises and drug cartels; (3) the diversion of marijuana to
states that deem marijuana illegal; (4) state-authorized marijuana ac-
tivity from being used as a pretext for trafficking other illegal drugs;
(5) violence in the cultivation and distribution of marijuana; (6)
drugged driving; (7) the cultivation of marijuana on public lands; and
(8) marijuana use or possession on federal property.68
However, the Cole Memorandum also made clear that federal laws
concerning marijuana can still be enforced, regardless of state law,
very much like the DOJ’s 2009 Memorandum concerning medicinal
64. Alison Vekshin, Legal-Marijuana Trend Spreads as More States Weigh Votes, BLOOMBERG
(Oct. 7, 2013, 11:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-10-08/legal-marijuana-trend-
spreads-as-more-states-weigh-votes.html.
65. COLO. CONST. art. 18, § 16(3)(a), (b); Amendment 64—Legalize Marijuana Election Re-
sults, DENVER POST, http://data.denverpost.com/election/results/amendment/2012/64-legalize-
marijuana/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2015); see also Amendment 64: The Regulate Marijuana like
Alcohol Act of 2012, CAMPAIGN TO REGULATE MARIJUANA LIKE ALCOHOL, http://www.regu-
latemarijuana.org/s/regulate-marijuana-alcohol-act-2012 (last visited Jan. 8, 2015).
66. WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.360(3); Washington Marijuana Legalization and Regulation, In-
itiative 502 (2012), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/Washington_Marijuana_Legalization_
and_Regulation,_Initiative_502_%282012%29 (last visited Apr. 13, 2015).
67. See Cole Memorandum, supra note 6, at 2.
68. Id. at 1–2.
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marijuana.69  The proclamation gave states like Colorado and Wash-
ington leeway to enact regulatory structures that aim to incorporate
the stated objectives while still reserving its right to prosecute such
endeavors through the CSA’s prohibition.70  Stated otherwise, recrea-
tional marijuana business owners and financial institutions offering
banking services are afforded no impunity; they enter the market at
their own peril.
1. Colorado’s Recreational Marijuana Law
On November 6, 2012, Colorado voters approved an amendment to
the Colorado Constitution, Article XVIII, section 16, popularly
known as “Amendment 64,” which not only legalized up to an ounce
of marijuana for personal use by persons 21 or older, but also legal-
ized the retail sale of medical and recreational marijuana by licensed
establishments.71  Governor John Hickenlooper established the
Amendment 64 Implementation Task Force, which proposed exten-
sive policy recommendations to Colorado’s General Assembly on how
to govern businesses cultivating and selling marijuana.72  On Septem-
ber 9, 2013, Colorado became the first state to adopt final rules gov-
erning recreational marijuana businesses.73  The rules cover licensing,
inventory tracking, advertising, and many other areas, and are the
most comprehensive effort of any state thus far to transform the mari-
juana market into a controlled, legitimate industry.74
Recreational marijuana storeowners first opened their doors on
January 1, 2014.75  All marijuana stores, cultivation centers, and mari-
juana-infused product makers must be licensed and must pay fees
ranging from $2,800 to $14,000, which do not include an initial appli-
69. Cf. Paul Armentano, What the Justice Department Pot Memo Means, HIGH TIMES (Sept. 4,
2013), http://www.hightimes.com/read/what-justice-department-pot-memo-means.
70. Cole Memorandum, supra note 6, at 4.
71. Kelly Damewood, Colorado Introduces New Standards for Marijuana-Infused Food, FOOD
SAFETY NEWS (Sept. 25, 2013), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2013/09/colorado-introduces-
new-rules-on-marijuana-infused-food/.
72. MARIJUANA ENFORCEMENT DIV., COLO. DEP’T OF REVENUE, PERMANENT RULES RE-
LATED TO THE COLORADO RETAIL MARIJUANA CODE 1 (2013), available at www.colorado.gov/
cs/Satellite?blobcol=urldata&blobheader=application%2Fpdf&blobkey=id&blobtable=Mungo
Blobs&blobwhere=1251883847085&ssbinary=true.
73. Eliza Gray, New Laws Chart Course for Marijuana Legalization, TIME (Oct. 19, 2013),
http://nation.time.com/2013/10/19/new-laws-chart-course-for-marijuana-legalization/.
74. John Ingold, Colorado First State in Country To Finalize Rules for Recreational Pot, DEN-
VER POST (Sept. 10, 2013, 3:20 PM), http://www.denverpost.com/breakingnews/ci_24062676/colo-
rado-first-state-country-finalize-rules-recreational-pot.
75. Michael Martinez, Colorado’s Recreational Marijuana Stores Make History, CNN (Jan. 1,
2014, 8:47 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/12/31/us/colorado-recreational-marijuana/.
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cation fee of $5,000.76  Notwithstanding these barriers to entry, ac-
cording to the state’s Department of Revenue’s Marijuana
Enforcement Division (MED), as of October 1, 2014, 496 licensed
medical marijuana stores were in current operation, as well as 242 rec-
reational shops.77
Logistically, Colorado residents are allowed to buy one ounce of
marijuana per visit, as compared to nonresidents, who are limited to
purchasing only one quarter of an ounce.78  Moreover, Colorado re-
sidents may home-grow up to six marijuana plants and also have the
option of purchasing edible products.79  In order to keep marijuana
away from minors, containers must be opaque and child proof and
must have detailed labels;80 there are also strict advertising guidelines
designed to minimize exposure to anyone under the age of 21.81  Mari-
juana businesses cannot be within 1,000 feet of another marijuana bus-
iness or other sensitive locations, such as schools and playgrounds.82
2. Washington’s Recreational Marijuana Law
Washington’s I-502 establishes a precedent for growing, processing,
retailing, and possessing marijuana.83  On October 16, 2013, the Wash-
ington State Liquor Control Board (LCB) officially adopted regula-
tions for state-licensed marijuana growers, processors, and retailers,
and businesses officially opened their doors on July 8, 2014.84
According to the regulations, a person must be 21 years old to le-
gally possess marijuana, hold a marijuana license, or enter a licensed
76. Colorado Recreational Marijuana Rules Finalized, STRAINWISE, http://www.strainwise
.com/2013/09/colorado-recreational-marijuana-rules/ (last visited Jan 8, 2015) [hereinafter Mari-
juana Rules Finalized].
77. Katie Kuntz, Colorado’s Marijuana Industry Got a Bit Bigger This Week as State Issues 96
New Licenses, ROCKY MOUNTAIN PBS (Oct. 3, 2014), http://inewsnetwork.org/2014/10/03/
colorados-marijuana-industry-got-a-bit-bigger-this-week-96-new-licenses/.
78. Alexandra Stembaugh, Legal Marijuana Laws: Colorado v. Washington, L. STREET (July
11, 2014), http://lawstreetmedia.com/issues/law-and-politics/legal-marijuana-laws-colorado-v-
washington/ (stating that price in Colorado averages from $16 to $20 per gram).
79. Id.
80. Marijuana Rules Finalized, supra note 76.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Jonathan Kaminsky, Washington State Floats Stricter Controls on Lightly Regulated Medi-
cal Pot, REUTERS (Oct. 23, 2013, 1:49 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/23/usa-mari-
juana-washington-idUSL1N0IC1VE20131023.
84. Jacob Sullum, Washington’s Goal for State-Licensed Pot Shops: Just 25% of the Market?,
REASON.COM (Oct. 17, 2013), http://reason.com/blog/2013/10/17/washingtons-goal-for-state-li-
censed-pot; see also Matt Ferner, Recreational Marijuana Shops Open in Colorado, HUFFINGTON
POST (Jan. 1, 2014, 7:02 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/01/01/marijuana-shops-open-
colorado_n_4519506.html (“Washington state’s recreational marijuana shops are expected to
open later this year.”); Stembaugh, supra note 78.
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marijuana business.85  Unlike Colorado, both Washington residents
and nonresidents may possess one ounce of useable marijuana, sixteen
ounces of marijuana-infused product in solid form, or seventy-two
ounces of marijuana-infused product in liquid form.86
Moreover, Washington integrates both medical and recreational
producer and processor licenses into one system.87  Under the rules,
the board will issue licenses for up to 334 marijuana stores across the
state, with no distinction between medical and recreational mari-
juana.88  In order to qualify for a license, Washington imposes a three-
month residency requirement, with personal criminal history, finger-
print, and background checks of all applicants.89
Both medical and recreational marijuana are taxed the same, but an
exemption is provided from state and local retail sales and use taxes
on purchases by medical marijuana patients registered with the De-
partment of Health.90  Unlike Colorado’s 15% excise tax, 10% sales
tax, and 2.9% standard sales tax, producers in Washington must pay a
25% excise tax on wholesale sales in addition to business and occupa-
tion taxes as a wholesaler.91  Processors must pay a 25% excise tax on
wholesale sales and business and occupation taxes as a manufac-
turer.92  Lastly, retailers must pay a 25% excise tax and business and
occupation taxes on retail sales, and collect state and local retail sales
and use taxes.93  These taxes are in addition to standard state sales tax
of 8.75%, and are projected to add 37% to the retail price of
marijuana.94
Moreover, Washington has imposed a restriction on the total
amount of marijuana that can be produced per year in the state.95
Regulators at the Liquor Control Board decided to cap the legal mar-
ket at eighty metric tons—forty for usable marijuana and forty for
85. WASH. STATE LIQUOR CONTROL BD., DRAFT RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE MEDICAL MA-
RIJUANA WORK GROUP 1 (2013) [hereinafter DRAFT RECOMMENDATIONS], available at http://
dispensarypermits.com/pdf/wash-draft-10-21-13.pdf.
86. Id. at 3.
87. Id.
88. Gene Johnson, Washington State Approves Rules for Marijuana Industry, WASH. TIMES
(Oct. 17, 2013), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/oct/17/washington-state-approves-
rules-marijuana-industry/.
89. Draft Recommendations, supra note 85, at 3.




94. Brian Bremner & Vincent Del Giudice, Legal Weed’s Strange Economics in Colorado,
BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-01-09/colorado-legal-
marijuanas-strange-economics.
95. Id.
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other marijuana products—reasoning that such a limit will avoid “di-
version,” where surplus legal marijuana is smuggled to other states.96
Diversion is a major concern of federal authorities, and while Colo-
rado has not imposed a cap, regulators are willing to in the future if
necessary.97
D. Current Federal Tax and Banking Laws in Need of Reform
Marijuana businesses, even those that are legally licensed, are con-
sidered criminal enterprises under federal law, which makes handling
their money a crime in the eyes of the DOJ.98  Therefore, processing
money from marijuana sales puts federally insured banks at risk of
drug racketeering charges because any bank that takes money from an
illegal enterprise can lose its FDIC coverage under the CSA.99  Conse-
quently, financial institutions often refuse to do business with mari-
juana-related businesses, fearing criminal prosecution.100  Marijuana
businesses cannot open bank accounts, secure lines of credit, or obtain
loans from these federally insured financial institutions.101  Thus, legit-
imate marijuana businesses are operating on a cash-only basis, which
is a prescription for safety concerns, tax evasion, and other criminal
activity.102  Given that the status quo is unworkable and presents
safety concerns, the federal government must reform the banking and
tax laws that hamper the creation of legitimate marijuana businesses.
Specifically, Congress should enact legislation giving banks the au-
thority to service the marijuana industry without fear of prosecution
or sanctions.  Moreover, the IRS should suspend the penalty it im-
poses on marijuana businesses until access to financial services is
granted.  Lastly, Congress should create an exception to § 280E, per-
mitting business owners to deduct their necessary and ordinary busi-
ness expenses from their federal income taxes.
96. Id.
97. Gray, supra note 73.
98. Jerry Cornfield, Banks Willing To Serve Pot Industry, but Not Able, HERALD BUS. J. (Oct.
28, 2013, 12:01 AM), http://www.heraldnet.com/article/20131028/BIZ/710289959/Banks-willing-
to-serve-pot-industry-but-not-able; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1956(2)(A) (2012); Brian Kindle, SAR
Data Reveals Few Institutions Willing To Bank the Marijuana Industry, Despite FinCEN and
DOJ Guidance, ASS’N CERTIFIED FIN. CRIMES SPECIALISTS (Aug. 13, 2014), http://www.acfcs
.org/sar-data-reveals-few-institutions-willing-to-bank-the-marijuana-industry-despite-fincen-and-
doj-guidance/ (“Conducting transactions with the proceeds of marijuana sales is considered a
‘specified unlawful activity’ under the primary US money laundering law.”).
99. See Clark, supra note 17.
100. Pete Yost, Feds Seek To Legalize Marijuana Industry Banking, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept.
10, 2013, 9:07 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/congress-looks-justices-marijuana-decision.
101. Cornfield, supra note 98.
102. Yost, supra note 100.
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Although the Obama Administration appears to have given the
green light for states to legalize recreational marijuana so long as their
regulations comply with the objectives of the Cole Memorandum, its
apparent approval clearly does not apply to access to financial re-
sources.  The DOJ first addressed this issue in 2011, when American
Express announced it would no longer handle medical marijuana re-
lated transactions for fear of federal prosecution.103  Just one month
later, Deputy Attorney General Cole gave banks an explicit directive,
stating that “[t]hose who engage in transactions involving the pro-
ceeds of such activity may also be in violation of federal money laun-
dering statues and other federal financing laws.”104  The message to
banks was clear: don’t do it.  Consequently, Bank of America avoided
handling accounts from marijuana dispensary businesses.105  Wells
Fargo, which served dispensaries in Colorado until 2011, backed away
in light of the CSA’s treatment of cannabis as a controlled
substance.106
In an October 2, 2013 letter to the Treasury Department, the FDIC,
the National Credit Union Association, and the Comptroller of Cur-
rency, Governors Hickenlooper and Inslee of Colorado and Washing-
ton, respectively, urged federal financial institutions to find a way to
permit normal banking transactions, the use of credit cards, and other
activities for marijuana businesses.107  In light of these requests, Attor-
ney General Holder told the governors that the DOJ was “actively
considering” how to regulate interactions between banks and state-
licensed marijuana shops that do not violate other federal law en-
forcement priorities.108  According to their conversation, “[F]inancial
institutions and other enterprises that do business with marijuana
shops that are in compliance with state laws are unlikely to be prose-
cuted for money laundering or other federal crimes that could be
brought under existing federal drug laws.”109
On February 14, 2014, in response to the governors’ requests, the
DOJ and the U.S. Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforce-
103. Id.
104. Id.




107. Cornfield, supra note 98.
108. Ryan Grim & Ryan J. Reilly, Department of Justice “Actively Considering” How To Al-
low Bank, Pot Shop Transactions, Citing Public Safety, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 30, 2013, 9:00
AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/30/banks-marijuana_n_3842526.html.
109. Id.
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ment Network (FinCEN) issued new banking guidelines.110  Accord-
ing to FinCEN Director Jennifer Shasky Calvery, the guidance signals
that it is possible to provide financial services to state-licensed mari-
juana businesses and still be in compliance with federal anti-money-
laundering laws.111  According to the guidance, “[T]he decision to
open, close, or refuse any particular account or relationship should be
made by each financial institution based on a number of factors spe-
cific to that institution.”112  In assessing the risk of providing services
to a marijuana-related business, the guidance provides that a financial
institution should conduct customer due diligence,113 which includes
measures such as verifying a business is duly licensed and registered,
and determining whether a potential client implicates one of the Cole
Memorandum priorities or violates state law.114
If a financial institution does decide to provide services to a mari-
juana-related business, it must file a Suspicious Activity Report
(SAR) pursuant to the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA).115  The BSA
requires
110. FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FIN-2014-G001, BSA
EXPECTATIONS REGARDING MARIJUANA-RELATED BUSINESSES 1 (2014) [hereinafter FINCEN
GUIDANCE], available at http://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/guidance/pdf/FIN-2014-G001.pdf;
see also Serge F. Kovaleski, U.S. Issues Marijuana Guidelines for Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15,
2014, at A10.
In a seven-page document explaining the guidelines, FinCEN called for “due diligence”
by financial institutions in monitoring their marijuana customers, including reviewing
their applications for state licenses and understanding their “normal and expected ac-
tivity” such as the types of products they sell and whether they have medical or recrea-
tional customers.
Kovaleski, supra.
In a three-page memo to prosecutors issued in conjunction with the new banking guide-
lines, Deputy Attorney General James M. Cole wrote that prosecutions may not be
“appropriate” when banks do business with marijuana entities that are operating le-
gally under state law and do not violate any of the eight priorities set forth in a Justice
Department memo last August.
Id.
111. Evan Perez, Banks Cleared To Accept Marijuana Businesses, CNN (Feb. 17, 2014, 8:39
PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/02/14/politics/u-s-marijuana-banks/; see also Kovaleski, supra
note 110 (“The guidance ‘will provide transparency and mitigate the risks to the financial sys-
tem,’ Ms. Shasky Calvery said.  The authorities do not intend to crack down on banks ‘for a
technical mishap,’ she said, adding: ‘We are not looking to have a gotcha [sic] enforcement
regime.’”).
112. FINCEN GUIDANCE, supra note 110, at 2 (“These factors may include its particular busi-
ness objectives, an evaluation of the risks associated with offering a particular product or service,
and its capacity to manage those risks effectively.  Thorough customer due diligence is a critical
aspect of making this assessment.”).
113. Id. at 2–3 (outlining seven due diligence factors).
114. Id. at 3.
115. See 31 C.F.R. § 1020.320 (2012).
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A financial institution is required to file a SAR if it knows, suspects,
or has reason to suspect that a transaction conducted or attempted
by, at, or through the financial institution: (i) involves funds derived
from illegal activity or is an attempt to disguise funds derived from
illegal activity; (ii) is designed to evade regulations promulgated
under the BSA, or (iii) lacks a business or apparent lawful
purpose.116
Therefore, due to marijuana’s classification as a Schedule I substance,
a financial institution is always required to file a SAR on activity in-
volving a marijuana business even if the business is licensed under
state law.
Following the issuance of FinCEN’s guidance, banks are now be re-
quired to file even more detailed SARs depending on whether the
bank believes a marijuana business is running afoul of the priorities
outlined in the Cole Memorandum or is violating state law.  If a finan-
cial institution reasonably believes that a business is in compliance
with both, it should file a “Marijuana Limited” SAR.117  In contrast, if
a financial institution reasonably believes a marijuana business impli-
cates any one of the Cole priorities or state law, it should file a “Mari-
juana Priority” SAR.118   If it becomes necessary to terminate a
relationship with a marijuana business in order to maintain an effec-
tive anti-money-laundering compliance program, a financial institu-
tion should file a SAR using the term “Marijuana Termination” in the
narrative section.119  In order to determine whether a marijuana busi-
ness is engaged in activity that implicates one of the Cole Memoran-
dum priorities, the guidance sets forth a nonexhaustive list of red
flags, including “tells” such as the business receiving substantially
more revenue than its local competitors or the business is depositing
116. FINCEN GUIDANCE, supra note 110, at 3.
117. Id. at 3–4.
The content of this SAR should be limited to the following information: (i) identifying
information of the subject and related parties; (ii) addresses of the subject and related
parties; (iii) the fact that the filing institution is filing the SAR solely because the sub-
ject is engaged in a marijuana-related business; and (iv) the fact that no additional
suspicious activity has been identified. . . .
A financial institution should follow FinCEN’s existing guidance on the timing of
filing continuing activity reports for the same activity initially reported on a “Marijuana
Limited” SAR.
Id. (footnote omitted).
118. Id. at 4.
119. Id. (“To the extent the financial institution becomes aware that the marijuana-related
business seeks to move to a second financial institution, FinCEN urges the first institution to use
Section 314(b) voluntary information sharing (if it qualifies) to alert the second institution of
potential illegal activity.”).
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more cash than is commensurate with the amount of revenue it is re-
porting for federal and state tax purposes.120
Though FinCEN’s guidance purports to enhance the availability of
financial services for marijuana-related businesses,121 it in no way
grants banks immunity from prosecution or relief from civil penalties
for serving legal marijuana businesses.122  According to Frank Keat-
ing, President and CEO of the American Bankers Association, the
new rules are not stringent enough, given that the possession and dis-
tribution of marijuana violates federal law, and banks that support
those activities still face the risk of prosecution and sanctions.123
Furthermore, the current federal tax code discourages the forma-
tion of legitimate marijuana businesses.  As an initial matter, legal ma-
rijuana businesses operating without bank accounts are assessed a ten
percent penalty on federal employee withholding taxes that they are
required to pay electronically but are forced to pay in cash.124  The
IRS requires all businesses to pay the quarterly tax via the Electronic
Federal Tax Payment (EFTP) System—an impossibility for marijuana
shops that are unable to obtain banking services.125  Instead of waiv-
ing the penalty for cash-only businesses, the IRS denied a petition for
abatement of these penalties, reasoning that alternatives to electronic
filing are available—namely, relying on third parties.126  However, ac-
cording to a Denver attorney, these alternatives are criminal because
they force taxpayers to engage in money laundering.127
More significantly, marijuana-related businesses are unable to de-
duct business expenses from their gross income when paying federal
income taxes, regardless of whether the operation is licensed under
120. Id. at 5.  Some other red flags include (1) the business receives substantially more reve-
nue than may reasonably be expected given the relevant limitations imposed by the state in
which it operates; (2) the business is unable to demonstrate that its revenue is derived exclu-
sively from the sale of marijuana in compliance with state law, as opposed to revenue derived
from the sale of other illicit drugs, the sale of marijuana not in compliance with state law, or
other illegal activity; (3) the business makes cash deposits or withdrawals over a short period of
time that are excessive relative to local competitors or the expected activity of the business; and
(4) the business is unable to demonstrate the legitimate source of significant outside investments.
Id. at 5–6.
121. Id. at 1.
122. Kovaleski, supra note 110. The Guidance does, however, “direct[ ] prosecutors and regu-
lators to give priority to cases where financial institutions fail to adhere to the guidance.” Id.
123. Id.
124. See Brian Mahoney, Bank Regs Led to Tax Woes for Weed Dispensary, Court Told, LAW
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state law.  Section 280E of the Federal Income Tax Code states that
taxpayers “trafficking in controlled substances” receive “no deduc-
tion” for any expenses beyond the cost of producing or buying inven-
tory.128  This provision was enacted at the height of the Reagan
administration’s “war on drugs” in 1982, and intended to stop drug
kingpins and cartels from claiming tax deductions.129  However, this
provision has yet to be amended despite twenty-three states and the
District of Columbia legalizing medical marijuana, and Alaska, Colo-
rado, Oregon, and Washington legalizing recreational marijuana.130
Due to marijuana’s Schedule I classification, income from the sale
of marijuana is taxable, but all other business expenses, such as wages
and salaries, health and other insurance premiums, rent, pension
plans, equipment, and utility costs, are not deductible and thus nega-
tively affect the company’s taxable profit.131  In essence, marijuana
businesses pay a gross receipts tax instead of an income tax.132  Stud-
ies show that the code effectively gives marijuana businesses an 87.5%
tax rate while other businesses function at 35% tax rate.133
To illustrate this disparity, if two nearly identical businesses each
have $600,000 in business revenue and one was a marijuana-related
business, each business is allowed to deduct the costs of goods sold—
say, $300,000—but only the nonmarijuana business can deduct “ordi-
nary and necessary” business expenses.134  While the nonmarijuana
business might deduct, for example, $200,000 of ordinary and neces-
128. 26 U.S.C. § 280E (2012); see also Benjamin Moses Leff, Tax Planning for Marijuana
Dealers, 99 IOWA L. REV. 523, 530 (2014) (“In order to determine the business’s taxable income,
one starts with all of the money coming in to the business—its gross revenue—and then sub-
tracts out all of the business expenses like salaries, rent, advertising, employee health insurance,
state and local taxes, license fees, bookkeeping, accounting and legal services, among other
things.”).
129. Miranda Green, Congressmen Introduce Bills To Aid Legal Marijuana Businesses, DAILY
BEAST (Sept. 25, 2013), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/09/25/congressmen-intro-
duce-bills-to-aid-legal-marijuana-businesses.html; see also S. REP. NO. 97-494, at 309 (1982) (“To
allow drug dealers the benefit of business expense deductions at the same time that the U.S. and
its citizens are losing billions of dollars per year to such persons is not compelled by the fact that
such deductions are allowed to other, legal, enterprises.”).
130. As of May 19, 2015, Alaska, Colorado, Oregon, and Washington have legalized recrea-
tional marijuana. See State Marijuana Laws Map, supra note 5.
131. See Oglesby, supra note 20.
132. Edward J. Roche, Jr., Federal Income Taxation of Medical Marijuana Businesses, 66 TAX
LAW. 429, 457–58 (2013); see also Leff, supra note 128, at 526 (“Now that the [tax] provision
applies to state-sanctioned marijuana sellers as well as illegal drug dealers, it creates a federal tax
situation that some believe may drive legitimate marijuana sellers out of business.”).
133. Green, supra note 129.
134. Katie Rucke, Trade Organization Pushes Federal Tax Reforms for Marijuana Businesses,
MINTPRESS NEWS (Sept. 14, 2013), http://www.mintpressnews.com/trade-organization-pushes-
federal-tax-reforms-for-marijuana-businesses/168953/.
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sary business expenses, § 280E bars the marijuana business from tak-
ing the same deduction.135  And if both businesses were taxed at a
35% tax rate, the marijuana business would pay a tax bill $70,000
greater than the other, and would have an average effective tax rate
much higher than the nonmarijuana business.136  Effectively, this dis-
courages marijuana-related businesses from hiring more workers, in-
creasing wages, providing additional benefits, or investing in capital
expenditures.137  According to House Representative Earl Blumen-
auer, legal marijuana businesses are barred from claiming advantages
such as the work opportunity tax credit if they hire a veteran, or from
depreciating their American-made irrigation equipment.138  However,
without congressional action in the form of an exception to § 280E,
state-licensed marijuana businesses will continue to be disadvantaged
by unequal tax treatment.139
III. ANALYSIS
Ever since Colorado and Washington became the first jurisdictions
in the world to legalize marijuana for recreational use,140 the million-
dollar question has been how the federal government would react.
Proponents of legalization hoped that the time had finally come when
President Obama, an admitted inhaler,141 would finally end America’s
exhausted war on cannabis.  However, instead of enforcing the CSA
or attempting to reclassify marijuana,142 the federal government has
adopted an accommodation strategy that may sound progressive in
theory, but is largely ineffective for entrepreneurs endeavoring to
enter the recreational marijuana market.  As long as marijuana re-





139. Green, supra note 129.
140. Michael Kelley, Colorado and Washington Are the First Places in the World Where Weed
Is Truly Legal, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 8, 2012, 4:49 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/legal-mari-
juana-colorado-washington-2012-11 (“No modern jurisdiction has removed the prohibition on
commercial production, distribution, and possession of marijuana for non-medical purposes. Not
even Holland.”).
141. Nick Gillepsie, 8 Things We Won’t Miss When Pot Is Legal Everywhere, TIME (Oct. 24,
2013), http://ideas.time.com/2013/10/24/8-things-we-wont-miss-when-pot-is-legal-everywhere/.
142. For a discussion of the federal government’s options concerning marijuana legalization,
see Reid, supra note 30, at 173 (“The United States has three options: (1) legalize marijuana’s
production and use, (2) change marijuana from a Schedule I to a Schedule II substance, which
would permit marijuana use for medical purposes, or (3) enforce current federal law under the
CSA that criminalize the production and use of marijuana.”).
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the areas of banking and tax law to ensure that the sale of recreational
marijuana is regulated, safe, and efficient.
Under the current system, limited access to financial services and
the penal nature of § 280E present two very real concerns for recrea-
tional marijuana retailers that hope to surpass the limited success of
medical dispensaries.143  Though dispensaries have faced the same ob-
stacles, the issues surrounding banking and taxing laws have taken
greater urgency in light of the growing popularity for marijuana legali-
zation and research projecting that the legal cannabis industry could
generate revenues of $35 billion by 2020.144  However, given that the
federal government reserved its right to shut down the entire industry,
the government must enact banking and tax reforms to match its deci-
sion to unilaterally suspend the enforcement of federal drug laws.145
In the area of banking, Congress—instead of the DOJ or Trea-
sury—should respond to pleas from states to allow access to financial
services, which is a necessary component to ensuring a highly regu-
lated marijuana system that will accurately track funds, prevent crimi-
nal involvement, and promote public safety.146  Though the directives
from FinCEN are a step in the right direction, our legislature needs to
enact legislation establishing how banks can provide financial services
to marijuana businesses without fear of federal prosecution.  The risk
is too great for many banks to rely on mere “guidance,” and Congress
needs to open banking services to the marijuana market and put an
end to dangerous cash-only businesses.
In the area of tax, the IRS should first suspend the penalty it as-
sesses on marijuana businesses that are forced to pay quarterly em-
ployee-withholding taxes in cash until Congress provides access to
banking services.  Second, Congress should amend the current Inter-
nal Revenue Code, which threatens to tax recreational marijuana
stores out of business, risking an increase in black market sales.147
Given the unlikelihood of marijuana being rescheduled  from its
Schedule I classification, and thus making § 280E inapplicable, Con-
gress should instead create an exception to § 280E allowing state-li-
143. Gillepsie, supra note 141.
144. Christopher Ingraham, The Marijuana Industry Could Be Bigger than the NFL by 2020,
WASH. POST (Oct. 24, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/10/24/the-
marijuana-industry-could-be-bigger-than-the-nfl-by-2020/.
145. The President Inhales, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 21, 2014, 7:41 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/
articles/SB10001424052702303802904579334710499090836.
146. Matt Ferner, Marijuana Businesses Need More Flexibility in Federal Banking Regulations:
Govs. Hickenlooper, Inslee, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 3, 2013, 4:58 PM), http://www.huf-
fingtonpost.com/2013/10/03/marijuana-banking_n_4038955.html.
147. See Leff, supra note 128, at 534.
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censed marijuana businesses to deduct necessary and ordinary
business expenses.  Such an allowance would increase the cash flow of
marijuana-related businesses, incentivizing owners to engage in activi-
ties such as awarding larger salaries and participating in investment
opportunities.
A. From Medical Dispensaries to Retail Marijuana Stores
Marijuana businesses, which are rapidly entering the marketplace
due to the success of state legalization campaigns, are drawing the eye
of investors who see the trade as one of the largest growth sectors,148
some even calling it the next “great American industry.”149  Though
the medical marijuana market is projected to grow into a $9 billion
industry by 2016,150 these numbers hardly compare to the staggering
$35 to $40 billion that the recreational marijuana industry could gen-
erate in the American market.151  Consequently, the stakes are rising
due to the amount of money that is being invested in the retail shops,
but investment is nevertheless constrained given the possibility that
the federal government can shut down a retail store at any time.152
Despite the risks associated with these types of ventures, the rapid
growth in marijuana businesses is in large part attributable to the 51%
of Americans who support the legalization of marijuana.153  The na-
tional consensus in favor of legalization seems to be driving the green
growing industry and business tripled in 2013, attracting hedge funds
and institutional investors.154
Further, this investment action has only been increasing ever since
Colorado and Washington began offering recreational marijuana for
sale.  According to Troy Dayton, cofounder and CEO of the AcrView
Group, which conducts market research on the marijuana industry,
the federal decision not to sue Colorado and Washington unleashed
investors, and it is predicted that the legal marijuana business will top
148. Jane Wells, Investors See Legal Marijuana as Growth Industry, NBC NEWS (Nov. 8, 2013,
2:28 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/business/investors-see-legal-marijuana-growth-industry-
8C11565189.
149. Tim Haeck, Investors Think Cannabis Is Worth the Risk, MYNORTHWEST.COM (June 14,
2013, 10:35 AM), http://mynorthwest.com/11/2295592/Investors-think-cannabis-is-worth-the-risk.
150. J.J. Colao, Meet the Yale MBAs Trying To Tame the Marijuana Industry, FORBES (Mar.
26, 2013, 1:23 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jjcolao/2013/03/26/meet-the-yale-mbas-trying-to-
tame-the-marijuana-industry/ (a Forbes Contributor blog).
151. Id.
152. Id. (“It’s a big industry, just not a real industry.  It’s all still operating out of the
shadows.”).
153. Lydia Saad, Majority Continues To Support Pot Legalization in U.S., GALLUP (Nov. 6,
2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/179195/majority-continues-support-pot-legalization.aspx.
154. Wells, supra note 148.
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$10 billion within five years.155  Thus, the potential amount of money
to be generated by marijuana businesses is the most persuasive reason
for altering laws concerning financial services and taxation in order to
ensure a highly regulated marijuana system.
In Colorado alone, there are more than 240 recreational marijuana
shops in current operation, and that number is only projected to grow,
given that the state issued at least 46 more licenses in October 2014.156
Colorado officials project that the launching of this unprecedented
commercial market will ultimately gross $578 million in annual reve-
nues, including $67 million in tax receipts for the state.157
According to CEO Brendan Kennedy of Privateer Holdings Inc., a
Seattle-based private equity firm, “There has been a shift in thinking.
The majority now believe that marijuana will become legal.  Investors
are now not only more comfortable but they are doing more of their
own due diligence and they are coming to us having already made
their minds up about investing.”158  In 2012, it took eighteen months
to raise just $7 million for investment in the medical marijuana sec-
tor;159 however, in January 2014, Privateer raised $15 million in just
three weeks.160
Despite the projected value of the marijuana market, investors’
hopes are tempered by the risks.
There is a lot of money on the sidelines wondering what the govern-
ment will look like in 2016, because that election could change eve-
rything.  The feds have said as long as you are in compliance with
the laws of your state, we will just be watching.  But what happens
in 2016?161
It seems clear that the federal government’s legal opposition to ma-
rijuana seriously constrains the potential growth of the industry given
retailers’ limited access to financial institutions.  The industry has
been plagued by a lack of capital because most banks are wary of
155. Id.
156. Josh Voorhees, Higher Learning: What the Next Wave of Pot-Legalizing States Can Learn
from Colorado and Washington, SLATE (Oct. 8, 2014, 2:42 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/
news_and_politics/politics/2014/10/marijuana_legalization_what_the_next_wave_of_pot_legaliz
ing_states_can_learn.html.
157. Keith Coffman, World’s First State-Licensed Marijuana Retailers Open Doors in Colo-
rado, REUTERS (Jan. 1, 2014, 5:58 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/01/us-usa-mari-
juana-colorado-idUSBREA0000K20140101.
158. Bill Meagher, Private Equity Firing Up Medical Marijuana Sector, DEAL PIPELINE (June
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doing business with anyone who handles a drug that is still illegal
under federal law.  In June 2013, Visa and MasterCard stopped
processing transactions at dispensaries, while most banks refuse to
work with them at all.162  Consequently, more than 80% of marijuana-
related start-ups are self-funded by their founders, with just 3% of
funds coming from venture capital and 5% from angel investors.163
Instead of marijuana entrepreneurs having to rely on private inves-
tors to build these state-sanctioned businesses, the federal government
should formally exempt banks that service marijuana retailers and af-
ford them a genuine opportunity to craft transparent and regulated
markets devoid of underground dealers.  The potential revenue mari-
juana is projected to earn should only incentivize those in Washington
D.C. to take action to allow marijuana-related businesses to have ac-
cess to the banking system, legitimizing the creation of such ventures.
B. Cash-Only Businesses Present the Real Green Issue
in Marijuana Sales
Due to the federal government’s characterization of marijuana busi-
nesses as criminal enterprises, placing servicing banks at risk of crimi-
nal prosecution or loss of FDIC insurance coverage,164 Ryan Kunkel
found himself placing $1,000 bricks of cash into a brown bag before
quickly stashing the money into the trunk of his car to make the drive
to downtown Seattle.165  Despite the air of criminality, there is noth-
ing illegal in what Mr. Kunkel was doing; as an owner of five medical
marijuana dispensaries in Seattle, he was only lawfully preparing to
pay his income taxes at the Department of Revenue.166
Carrying such large amounts of cash is a terrible risk that freaks
me out a bit because there is the fear in my mind that the next car
pulling up beside me could be the crew that hijacks us.  So, we have
to play this never-ending shell game of different cars, different
routes, different dates and different times.167
162. Colao, supra note 150.
163. Angel Investor, INVESTOPEDIA.COM, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/angelinves-
tor.asp (last visited Jan. 7, 2015) (“An investor who provides financial backing for small startups
or entrepreneurs.  Angel investors are usually found among an entrepreneur’s family and
friends.  The capital they provide can be a one-time injection of seed money or ongoing support
to carry the company through difficult times.”); see also Shannon Bond, High Finance as Canna-
bis Fund Pitches Weed at Waldorf, CNBC (May 1, 2014, 2:57 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/
101631230#.
164. See Cornfield, supra note 98.
165. Serge F. Kovaleski, Banks Say No to Marijuana Money, Legal or Not, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
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Like Mr. Kunkel, legal marijuana merchants regularly face these
and other encumbrances associated with the current banking laws;
without bank accounts, they are forced to operate just like drug deal-
ers—cash only.  Given that the voters have spoken and the federal
government has opted for nonenforcement, it is time for legislators to
give banks legally binding regulations necessary to extend financial
services to state-licensed marijuana businesses.
While marijuana retailers hoped that the regulations issued by
FinCEN and the DOJ would enable banks to open their doors, the
language of the regulations fails to provide the type of clarity that
banks are seeking to service the emerging marijuana industry.168
Namely, the guidance fails to provide assurances that federal authori-
ties will withhold prosecution or otherwise avoid assessing penalties
against banks that engage with marijuana-related businesses.  More
assurance is required than memorandums to U.S. Attorneys to ensure
that banks are not “aiding and abetting” a criminal enterprise if they
provide services to marijuana businesses.169
Consequently, only 1% of banks nationwide are providing banking
services to marijuana businesses.170  And of the small handful of insti-
tutions that are providing services to the legal marijuana industry,
many have terminated relationships with customers despite issuance
of the FinCEN guidance.  Between August 8, 2014 and February 14,
2015, when the guidance was issued, financial institutions filed over
475 “Marijuana Termination” SARs, which are used when a financial
institution deems it necessary to terminate a relationship with a mari-
juana-related business.171  These numbers suggest that a greater num-
ber of institutions severed ties with marijuana businesses during the
period analyzed than those that provided services.
With only FinCEN’s guidance in place, the status quo will likely
remain, forcing newly licensed retail stores to operate on a cash-only
basis.  This type of financial system not only raises safety concerns, but
also is very difficult to audit, which can lead to tax evasion, wage theft,
and diversion of resources needed to protect public safety.172  Specifi-
168. Id.
169. FINCEN GUIDANCE, supra note 110, at 1.
170. Marijuana Dispensaries Need Access to Banking System, BOS. GLOBE (Sept. 9, 2014)
[hereinafter Marijuana Dispensaries], http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/editorials/2014/09/09/
legal-marijuana-sellers-need-access-banking-system/w2Dy5xWNqyHK09Ip5pZW5H/story.html#
comments.
171. Kindle, supra note 98.
172. See David Ingram, U.S. May Help Marijuana Shops Get Banking Services, REUTERS
(Sept. 10, 2013, 5:45 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/10/us-usa-crime-marijuana-
idUSBRE9891EK20130910.
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cally, many business owners have been forced to install panic buttons
for workers in the event of a robbery, as well as countless security
cameras and floor sensors to monitor the stores.173  Often, owners
must employ security firms, such as Colorado’s Blue Line Protection
Group, comprised of military veterans, to protect dispensaries, culti-
vation centers, and transports.174
Besides the burden of security concerns, retailers are often forced
to either pay employees with envelopes of cash or haul bags of cash to
supermarkets to buy money orders.175  If owners are able to open
bank accounts, most commonly by establishing holding companies,
they store money in plastic bags or sealed boxes to mask the smell of
marijuana.176  However, it is not unusual for a legitimate marijuana
business to go through a half-dozen bank accounts in a few years due
to accounts being closed after banks discover the nature of the under-
lying business.177
It may come as a surprise that states might be the first patrons that
banks are willing to serve.  Currently, both Colorado and Washington
have banking partners that appear willing to accept state deposits re-
lated to recreational marijuana178 despite marijuana’s Schedule I clas-
sification.  These state deposits will be derived from the hundreds of
thousands of dollars collected for application and licensing fees and
the millions of dollars in taxes derived from recreational marijuana
sales.179  Colorado’s Department of Revenue (DOR) currently uses
Wells Fargo, and according to the communications director for the
agency, the bank has never questioned where the money comes from
given that the DOR collects tax money for the entire state and does
not differentiate deposits according to industry.180
Moreover, Washington received approval from Bank of America to
deposit money generated by application and licensing fees and the
taxes it collects via recreational sales.181  Though Bank of America
already acted as the state’s financial institution, Washington did not
deposit revenue derived from medical-marijuana dispensary applica-
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tion or licensing fees because the state did not regulate the industry.
However, dispensary owners still pay sales and business taxes, which
go into Washington’s bank account, and state officials told Liquor
Control Board director, Rick Garza, that licensing would not affect
the state’s ability to deposit revenue.182  These officials reasoned that
“Washington is not the first state to license marijuana businesses, and
the federal government has never cracked down on states’ bank
accounts.”183
The ability of these states to deposit money from marijuana sales is
necessary to comply with the DOJ’s objectives; however, many finan-
cial institutions remain reluctant to extend services to retailers, and it
is difficult to fathom a cash-only business being “tightly regulated.”184
Nevertheless, the willingness of Wells Fargo and Bank of America to
conduct business with Colorado and Washington may be the first step
in ending cash-only retail marijuana businesses.  If major banks agree
to accept deposits from states, there is a chance they would eventually
loosen up their policies toward deposits from marijuana businesses.185
However, banks should not have to be persuaded by the growing
appeal of gaining access to an entirely new profit stream, consisting of
both money earned by state governments and profits generated by
marijuana businesses, to service the industry.  Instead, banks should
be able to offer financial services under the auspices of a reformed
federal law.  For now, however, most banks will most likely continue
to withhold services from marijuana merchants.
C. Proposed Congressional Action To Remedy Lack of Access
to Banking Services
Fortunately, Congress seems to be doing something about the prob-
lem.  In July 2014, the U.S. House of Representatives approved a bi-
partisan amendment, H.R. 5016, which allows banks to accept
deposits from marijuana businesses.186  Although the bill fails to ex-
plicitly state that banks can service the industry legally, it prevents the
Treasury Department from penalizing financial institutions that pro-
182. Jordan Schrader, Wash. State Shops for a Bank To Handle Marijuana Money, KOMO
NEWS (Sept. 22, 2013, 12:00 PM), http://www.komonews.com/news/local/Wash-state-shops-for-a-
bank-to-handle-pot-money-224785712.html.
183. Id.
184. Brady Dennis, Obama Administration Will Not Block State Marijuana Laws, if Distribu-
tion Is Regulated, WASH. POST (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-
science/obama-administration-will-not-preempt-state-marijuana-laws—for-now/2013/08/29/b725
bfd8-10bd-11e3-8cdd-bcdc09410972_story.html.
185. Rise of Recreational Marijuana, supra note 178.
186. See Marijuana Dispensaries, supra note 170.
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vide services to state-licensed marijuana businesses, and advocates say
it helps.187  According to Taylor West, deputy director of the National
Cannabis Industry Association,
It’s essentially forbidding the use of funds to target these
banks. . . .  Given that many banks seemed to feel that the guidance
issued in February was not concrete enough to give them the confi-
dence to start taking cannabis-related clients, it would be a big deal
to put that policy into actual law.188
Although representatives back the measure, approval in the Senate
is far from certain.  “If this provision eventually becomes law—and
one vote is far from that—an initial reading is that this appears to
remove some of the barriers for the (Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency) to financial services being available to marijuana busi-
nesses,” said Don Childears, president and CEO of the Colorado
Bankers Association.189  However, it remains unclear whether the
amendment would apply to the Federal Reserve or FDIC.190
Although the measure fails to explicitly provide prosecutorial im-
munity to financial institutions given that it only cuts off Treasury De-
partment funding, the Senate should approve the pending legislation
to address the immediate and growing concerns associated with these
cash-only businesses.  Doing so would provide certainty for banks and
allow business owners to begin applying for the services that they
need.191  While legislative action explicitly exempting financial institu-
tions from prosecution or sanctions is ideal, this amendment, if noth-
ing else, will help alter the current untenable status quo that forces
otherwise law-abiding businesses to operate on a cash-only basis,
187. Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, 2015, H.R. 5016, 113th
Cong. (2014).
None of the funds made available in this Act may be used, with respect to the States of
Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Ha-
waii, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Main, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont,
Washington or Wisconsin or the District of Columbia, to penalize a financial institution
solely because the institution provides financial services to an entity that is a manufac-
turer, producer, or a person that participates in any business or organized activity that
involves handling marijuana or marijuana products and engages in such activity pursu-
ant to a law established by a State or a unit of local government.
Id. § 916.
188. Id.
189. David Migoya, U.S. House OKs Bill that May Open Door to Bank Accounts for Pot
Shops, DENVER POST (July 17, 2014, 1:43 AM), http:www.denverpost.com/business/ci_26160270/
house-oks-bill-stop-feds-from-using-cash.
190. Id.
191. Perez, supra note 111.
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making them criminal targets and unduly burdening their
operations.192
D. The Current Tax Code Encourages Black Market Sales
Though “SWAT-style raids” and threatening letters have become
the most publicized measures used to target marijuana businesses, the
IRS has been functioning as an arm of justice, employing the Internal
Revenue Code as a weapon in the federal government’s ongoing war
against marijuana.193  As an initial matter, the IRS assesses penalties
on all marijuana businesses that pay their employee-withholding taxes
in cash due to the fact that it requires businesses to pay the tax via the
Electronic Federal Tax Payment (EFTP) System—an impossibility for
marijuana businesses that are denied banking services.194  More signif-
icantly, under § 280E, individuals involved in the sale of controlled
substances, including legalized marijuana, cannot deduct standard
business expenses on their federal income taxes.195  The IRS systemat-
ically targets marijuana establishments, relying on this obscure section
that gives the taxing agency unintended power.196   In light of state
laws legalizing the sale of medicinal and recreational marijuana, it is
well past time for the IRS to cease its persecution, which began long
before California became the first state to legalize medicinal mari-
juana in 1996.197
Therefore, the IRS should suspend the penalty it assesses on mari-
juana businesses that are forced to pay quartlerly employee withhold-
ing taxes until Congress adequately provides access to banking
services.  Next, Congress should create an exception for state-licensed
marijuana businesses due to changed factual circumstances that did
not exist and were not considered at the time of its adoption.  The tax
system, unchanged, threatens to tax marijuana retailers out of busi-
ness, and also decreases state-licensed marijuana businesses’ cash
flows, which creates a huge disincentive to hire more workers, in-
crease wages, provide additional benefits, or invest in things such as
infrastructure improvements.  Moreover, there is no reason why the
192. Migoya, supra note 189.
193. Clarence Walker, The IRS War on Medical Marijuana Providers, STOPTHEDRUGWAR
.ORG (May 16, 2013, 12:24 PM), http://stopthedrugwar.org/chronicle/2013/may/16/irs_war_medi
cal_marijuana_provid.
194. Migoya, supra note 18.
195. Walker, supra note 193.
196. Pat Oglesby, CNN Misunderstands the IRS and Marijuana Tax Enforcement: No Other
Shoe Can Drop, NEWREVENUE.ORG (Aug. 17, 2013), http://newrevenue.org/2013/08/17/cnn-mis-
understands-the-irs-and-marijuana-tax-enforcement-no-other-shoe-can-drop/.
197. See Mikos, supra note 45, at 636.
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tax code should deny ordinary and necessary business expense deduc-
tions to legitimate businesses established under state law.  The result
is an arbitrary and punitive situation in which employers face very
high average effective tax rates that Congress never sought to impose.
Through § 280E’s current application, numerous dispensaries have
become victims of tax enforcement, forcing them to close their doors
and lay off their staffs because the tax burden was too great.198
Though sales of illicit drugs have been purposely singled out since the
Reagan Administration, other illegal activities—prostitution, gam-
bling, and gunrunning—can still claim ordinary business expenses on
their taxes.199  This is because § 280E only singles out those trades or
businesses that are engaged in the trafficking of controlled sub-
stances.200  Unfortunately, the tax code does not make any distinction
between illegal black market drug sales and state-established, legal
marijuana businesses.201  Thus, it should come as no surprise that busi-
ness owners perceive federal tax hurdles as the biggest threat to the
marijuana industry.202
What the government fails to realize is that taxing legitimate busi-
nesses out of operation or driving them underground actually encour-
ages tax evasion by owners and only incites consumers to purchase
198. Marijuana Dispensaries Systematically Targeted by IRS, CANNABIS L. GROUP’S MED.
MARIJUANA LEGAL BLOG (June 5, 2013, 10:39 AM), http://www.marijuanalawyerblog.com/2013/
06/marijuana-dispensaries-systematically-targeted-by-irs.html; see also Walker, supra note 193
(“The attacks on Harborside and Oaksterdam were part of an IRS campaign of aggressive audits
using 280E to deny legitimate business expenses, such as rent, payroll, and all other necessary
business expenses.  These denials resulted in astronomical back tax bills for the affected dispen-
saries, threatening their viability—and patients’ access to medicine.”).
199. See Oglesby, supra note 20; see also Leff, supra note 128, at 533.
To be clear, this over-taxation of a marijuana seller’s income is not simply the result
of her engaging in an illegal business activity.  If [a business] were engaged in murder
for hire, [it] would owe federal income tax on the profits [it] made from such activity,
but would be allowed to deduct as ordinary and necessary business expenses the cost of
[its] gun and bullets, the cost of overnight travel to and from the crime scene, any
amounts [it] paid to employees or contractors who helped [it] carry out [the] crime, and
other expenses associated with . . . criminal activity.  Section 280E only applies to in-
come from selling controlled substances.
Leff, supra note 128, at 533 (footnotes omitted).
200. 26 U.S.C. § 280E (2012).
No deduction or credit shall be allowed for any amount paid or incurred during the
taxable year in carrying on any trade or business if such trade or business (or the activi-
ties which comprise such trade or business) consists of trafficking in controlled sub-
stances (within the meaning of schedule I and II of the Controlled Substances Act)




202. Leff, supra note 128, at 525.
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marijuana illegally on the black market.203  The IRS routinely disal-
lows normal tax deductions by marijuana-related businesses, effec-
tively shutting them down with a tax bill three or four times above
average.204  Denver Relief, a medical marijuana center, does just over
$1 million a year in sales, and not being able to take standard business
deductions costs the business tens of thousands of dollars annually
with a projected tax rate of about 50%.205  Moreover, an accountant in
Colorado specializing in medical marijuana tax law said one client did
not turn a profit in 2009, 2010, or 2011, but nevertheless was handed a
$300,000 tax bill from the IRS in 2012 for those three preceding
years.206  “If you have a license from the state hanging on your wall,
that doesn’t fit the definition of drug trafficking.  Yet the IRS is ag-
gressively auditing this industry.”207  These types of businesses are fac-
ing effective tax bills of 65% to 75% compared to 15% to 30% for
businesses in general.208
In 2011, the IRS defended its actions by claiming it was merely en-
forcing existing law, and reiterated that Congress would need to either
change the tax code or remove marijuana from its current classifica-
tion under the CSA as a Schedule I drug if it did not want marijuana
dealers caught up in these provisions.209  The effects of these onerous
provisions led Representative Earl Blumenauer to introduce the
Small Business Tax Equity Act of 2013, with the goal of amending
§ 280E to resolve this emerging crisis in the newly legal billion-dollar
industry.210  However, after it went to the House Ways and Means
Committee, it was “never heard from again.”211  Consequently, other
efforts to ignite code reforms are needed if marijuana retailers are to
escape burdensome taxation.
According to Betty Aldworth, deputy director for the National
Cannabis Industry Association, she is skeptical that members of Con-
203. See Walker, supra note 193.
204. David Downs, Marijuana’s IRS Problems Spark New Bill, SMELL THE TRUTH (May 29,
2013, 4:14 PM), http://blog.sfgate.com/smellthetruth/2013/05/29/marijuanas-taxation-problem-
sparks-new-bill/.
205. See Steve Hargreaves, Marijuana Dealers Get Slammed by Taxes, CNNMONEY (Feb. 25,




209. See Letter from Andrew J. Keyso, Deputy Assoc. Chief Couns. (Income Tax & Acct.),
IRS, to Fortney Pete Stark, U.S. House of Representatives (Mar. 25, 2011), available at http://
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/11-0005.pdf  (“The result you seek would require [ ] Congress to amend
either the Internal Revenue Code or the Controlled Substances Act.”).
210. See Downs, supra note 204 (describing the Act’s goal of ending the IRS’s persecution of
medical cannabis dispensaries).
211. See Walker, supra note 193.
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gress have an appetite to discuss reclassifying marijuana, even as
Americans seem against its current scheduling.  “Chang[ing] [the] tax
code to allow regulated businesses to be taxed fairly is an idea most
people can agree with.”212
Though the ultimate goal for opponents of marijuana prohibition is
federal legislation, it seems clear that any major reform of federal ma-
rijuana policy will most likely include a hefty federal excise tax to help
fund regulatory mechanisms and garner support from lawmakers who
would not otherwise be disposed to reform.213  Currently, cultivators
and distributors must pay federal income tax on their profits, though
buyers do not pay a federal excise tax on marijuana purchases as they
would if they bought alcohol or cigarettes.214  Advocates of legaliza-
tion understand how attractive a well-regulated and heavily taxed ma-
rijuana industry can be; but it is difficult to know at what point taxes
will encourage an illicit market.215
“The black market generally imposes its own costs—purveyors can
charge a premium because of the risks they incur.”216  The regulatory
burden for legal marijuana sales is also very high, especially since the
advent of stringent state laws overseeing the industry; regulations, like
the tax code proscribing business deductions, raise the price of legal
marijuana, which in effect encourages black market sales.217  The new
“tax liability” would be primarily focused on buyers, while growers
and sellers will continue to petition Congress for standard tax deduc-
212. Rucke, supra note 134.
213. Christopher Matthews, Will High Marijuana Taxes Encourage Black Markets?, TIME
(Feb. 25, 2013), http://www.business.time.com/2013/02/25/will-high-marijuana-taxes-encourage-
black-markets/.
214. See Howard Gleckman, Why Legal Marijuana Is a Good Argument for Tax Reform,
FORBES (Aug. 20, 2013, 3:52 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/beltway/2013/08/20/why-legal-ma-
rijuana-is-a-good-argument-for-tax-reform/.
215. Matthews, supra note 213.
It’s difficult to know for sure, but if a 50% tax were enacted on the federal level, the
marijuana industry in a state like Washington would face at least $1.92 in tax for every
$1 of product . . . produced.  Whether this level of taxation is enough to encourage a




In Colorado, for instance, where medical marijuana has been legal for more than a
decade, growers are required to keep their operations under 24-7 video surveillance,
produce criminal background checks on workers, and keep regulators alerted each and
every time they move product.  These are just a few of the regulations that can help
drive up the price of legal cannabis cultivation and encourage illicit markets to develop.
Id.
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tions.218  “They may be [marijuana] sellers, but they are still business
people who want to maximize after-tax returns.”219
The main point is that marijuana tax reform is finally about to re-
ceive the attention it deserves.  As marijuana grows in popularity and
continues to be legalized by states, marijuana businesses are in a
stronger position to argue for tax breaks.  Some warn that if Congress
does not treat marijuana sellers like other businesses, affording them
the same tax breaks, state plans to tax and regulate marijuana for rec-
reational use are doomed to fail from the outset.220  However, simple
congressional awareness will not be enough to fight off skeptics.  “If
they don’t like the fact that they can’t take certain tax deductions be-
cause they’re in an illegal business, then they should go into some
other business where they can take tax deductions,” says Jeffrey
Miron, the director of undergraduate studies in the Department of
Economics at Harvard University.221
Making it legal for marijuana-related businesses to deduct rent and
other business expenses from federal taxes is an effort “to respect the
law” that state voters passed approving recreational marijuana
sales.222  Moreover, considering the country’s burgeoning budget defi-
cit, the potential for billions of dollars in new federal tax revenue,
arguably extracted from criminal enterprises, should not be taken
lightly, as Steve DeAngelo noted:
There’s not really any other industry in the country—let alone one
that can bring in tens of billions of dollars in tax revenue—that’s
standing up and raising its hand and saying we’re ready to step up to
the plate and help the country solve its problems, but we are. We
hope Congress will hear us.223
Though marijuana business owners are trying to signal Congress
that the time is now to legalize marijuana, saying it is the “perfect
moment” as the nation faces a fiscal crisis,224 it seems more realistic
that members of the legislature will respond more favorably to an ex-
ception to the tax code that permits state-licensed businesses to de-
duct business expenses.  Advocates of such reform wish only to be
218. Gleckman, supra note 214.
219. Id. (“For instance, retailers could deduct costs such as rent, legal fees, and wages.  And,
like other small businesses, they might write off automobiles and office equipment. Growers
could deduct the cost of farm equipment and the like.”).
220. Rob Hotakainen, Marijuana Industry Eager To Pay Taxes—and Cash In on Deductions,
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taxed like other small businesses, and hope that the revenue derived
from marijuana sales may help Congress realize the lucrative opportu-
nities legalized marijuana presents to this country.
IV. IMPACT
The potential success or failure of recently opened recreational ma-
rijuana stores in Colorado and Washington, and those projected to
open in Alaska and Oregon, will undoubtedly shape the future of drug
policy in the United States.  Retailers in these states represent “the
institution of a major new public policy in America,”225 with legal ma-
rijuana expected to be one of the world’s fastest-growing business sec-
tors226  “What we’re witnessing now is a political movement giving
birth to an economic awakening.”227  States eager to reap these poten-
tial benefits are closely analyzing the legalization process and are
waiting to see whether other states will be able to prevent marijuana
from ending up in the hands of teenagers, the amount of tax revenue
raised, and whether drug traffickers will divert marijuana across state
lines.228  Specifically, “[i]f [a state] is able to successfully legalize mari-
juana without causing a social backlash, the tourism, tax and other
considerations are likely to compel several other states to quickly fol-
low suit.”229  However, under the current banking and tax system,
state-licensed marijuana businesses are treated as illegal drug traffick-
ers, and in the absence of congressional action, state lawmakers, mari-
juana business owners, and innovative law school professors have
been left with their own devices to craft ways to make the industry
workable.
225. Niraj Chokshi, Marijuana Sales Commence in Colorado for Recreational Use, WASH.
POST (Jan. 1, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/marijuana-sales-commence-in-colo-
rado-for-recreational-use/2014/01/01/977040d0-7320-11e3-8b3f-b1666705ca3b_story.html.
226. Bruce Barcott, A Tale of Two Drug Wars, ROLLING STONE, Jan. 16, 2014, at 35.
227. Id.
228. Legal Sales of Recreational Marijuana Begin in Colorado, DRUGFREE.ORG (Jan. 7, 2014),
https://www.drugfree.org/join-together/legal-sales-of-recreational-marijuana-begin-in-colorado;
see also Barcott, supra note 226, at 36.
There are a lot of ways this could go wrong.  A rise in DUIs, increased child access,
diversion across state lines, and some criminal element slipping into the regulated side
of the industry.  It could be as simple as a tractor-trailer full of marijuana stopped a
mile across the Utah border.
Barcott, supra note 226, at 36.
229. Chokshi, supra note 225.
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A group of state lawmakers in Washington, unsure of the current
prospects for federal legislation, proposed the establishment of a state
bank that would deal with all marijuana business.230
The state, rather than the [FDIC], would guarantee deposits, pro-
viding additional protections from federal seizure, while profits
from banking operations would be returned to the state.  As a lend-
ing institution, the trust would also help the state with an additional
mission to “facilitate investment in, and financing of, public infra-
structure system that will increase public health, safety, and quality
of life, improve environmental conditions, and promote community
vitality and economic growth.”231
Washington Senator Bob Hasegawa has been advocating for a state-
run bank for years, modeled off of a successful state bank in North
Dakota.232  But industry and legal experts counter that state-owned
banks are unworkable in states legalizing recreational marijuana be-
cause federal law specifically prohibits commercial banks from ac-
cepting deposits suspected of deriving from profits of illegal
activity;233 the bottom line is that the marijuana trade in federal legal
terms is still illegal.  According to Childears,
[F]ederal law says any entity that holds deposits from another per-
son, transfers funds between parties as in checks, debit cards, wire
transfers, or otherwise is connected to the payments system—the
movement of money from one financial entity to another party—
must abide by federal law. . . .  Without the payment system, such an
entity would amount to a big vault—cash in, cash out.234
While laudable in their efforts to create state solutions to state
problems, it seems that state lawmakers are saddled with the recent
DOJ and FinCEN guidance, which require banks to follow a detailed
list of rules.  The Colorado Bankers Association has deemed these
230. Rachel Estabrook, Even with New Federal Guidance, Colorado Bankers Wary of Mari-
juana Business, COLO. PUB. RADIO (Jan. 28, 2014), https://www.cpr.org/news/story/even-new-
federal-guidance-colorado-bankers-wary-marijuana-business; see also David “Goldy” Goldstein,
A State-Run Marijuana Bank: It Would Solve Two Problems at Once, STRANGER (Dec. 18, 2013),
http://www.thestranger.com/seattle/a-state-run-marijuana-bank/Content?oid=18503399 (“SB
5955 would address these problems by creating the ‘Washington publicly owned trust’ to accept
deposits from government agencies and legal marijuana businesses.  The state would be required
to deposit marijuana tax revenue in the trust, although businesses would be free to use private
banks if they chose.”).
231. Goldstein, supra note 230.
232. David Migoya, State-Owned Bank Won’t Work for Marijuana Cash, DENVER POST (Dec.
29, 2013, 12:01 AM), http://www.denverpost.com/marijuana/ci_24805239/state-owned-bank-
wont-work-marijuana-cash.
233. Id.
234. Id.  (“Essentially, banks would be a safe-deposit-box operation for a cash business that
couldn’t pay employees with checks or even cash-loaded cards.”).
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guidelines a “red light,”235 and according to the association’s senior
vice president, Jenifer Waller, the government has made it very clear
that financial institutions still face the risk of criminal liability.236  Wal-
ler stated that she did not know of a single bank that has changed its
position as a result of the federal guidance.237  “Operating on a memo
that is in conflict with the law is just unwise for any business, including
financial institutions.”238  Furthermore, according to the association’s
president, Don Childears, the guidance “reiterates reasons for prose-
cution and is simply a modified reporting system for banks to use,”
noting that “no bank can comply.”239
According to Childears, an act of Congress is likely the only remedy
that will change how bankers deal with marijuana businesses, and for
that to happen banks need to lobby Congress to enact reforms.240  “At
some point, you reach a tipping point in Congress where people are
willing to move ahead and amend the Controlled Substances Act.”241
Momentum for reform may be building given financial institutions’
negative reactions toward FinCEN’s and the DOJ’s attempted guide-
lines.  Disapproval of the FinCEN guidance by our nation’s banks
could be the needed momentum to garner support for H.R. 5016 cur-
rently pending in the Senate, which bars treasury and securities regu-
lators from spending money to penalize financial institutions that
work with legal marijuana businesses.  If the measure passes, it could
be the initial step to legislation explicitly allowing banks to service
marijuana-related businesses in states where the drug is legal.
Currently, state-licensed medicinal marijuana sellers often utilize a
tax loophole, which provides that when a dispensary is carrying on
more than one line of business, the expenses attributable to the
235. Herb Weisbaum, Banks Balk on Marijuana Money Despite US Guidelines, CNBC (Feb.
21, 2014, 8:05 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/101433431; see also Jacob Sullum, The Feds’ Scary
Reassurances to Banks That Deal with State-Licensed Marijuana Businesses, FORBES (Feb. 17,
2014, 5:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jacobsullum/2014/02/17/the-feds-scary-reassurances-
to-banks-that-deal-with-state-licensed-marijuana-businesses (a Forbes Contributor blog).  Ac-
cording to Don Childears, president of the Colorado Bankers Association, “After a series of red
lights, we expected this guidance to be a yellow one.  This isn’t close to that.  At best, this
amounts to ‘serve these customers at your own risk,’ and it emphasizes all of the risks.  This light
is red.”  Sullum, supra.
236. Weisbaum, supra note 235.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Sullum, supra note 235.
240. Estabrook, supra note 230.
241. Id.
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nonmarijuana line of business are not covered by § 280E.242  In 2007,
the Tax Court held that a business that both operated a marijuana
dispensary and provided caregiving services to patients could separate
its business expenses and deduct those expenses associated with the
caregiving activities.243  Though helpful to medical dispensaries,
§ 280E still dramatically increases the cost of operating a legitimate
marijuana business, especially recreational stores, which effectively in-
centivizes the creation of illegal or quasi-legal businesses.
In the absence of congressional action or agency discretion, scholars
in the field have also crafted novel ways to manipulate the tax code in
order to prevent state-sanctioned marijuana businesses from feeling
its punitive effects.  Professor Benjamin Moses Leff from the Ameri-
can University Washington College of Law advocates that sellers
avoid the impact of § 280E by qualifying as an exempt organization
under § 501(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code, which exempts “so-
cial welfare” organizations.244  “[Because] social welfare organiza-
tions, like charities, are exempt from federal income tax—they pay no
tax on either gross revenue or net income—§ 280E does not affect
them.”245  Professor Leff, however, notes that the Supreme Court held
that the “public policy doctrine acts as an absolute bar to exemption
as a charity under § 501(c)(3),”246 but argues that holding inapplicable
to social welfare organizations.247  Though novel and creative, Profes-
sor Leff explains that qualifying as a “social welfare organization”
could negatively impact the operation of marijuana businesses.248  For
242. Joel S. Newman, Deductions on a Higher Plane: Medical Marijuana Business Expenses,
LEXIS FED. TAX J.Q., Sept. 2013, at § 3.01, § 3.02, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2333969.
243. Californians Helping to Alleviate Med. Problems, Inc. v. Comm’r, 128 T.C. 173, 183–85
(T.C. 2007).
244. Leff, supra note 128, at 527.
To qualify as a § 501(c)(4) organization, a marijuana seller would have to meet four
statutory requirements: (1) it must have a proper tax-exempt purpose; (2) it must not
distribute its profits to any private persons; (3) it must avoid excessive campaign-re-
lated political activity; and (4) it must not operate in an excessively commercial
manner.
Id.; see also 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(4) (2012).
245. Leff, supra note 128, at 527.
246. Id. at 558.
The Supreme Court has held that the common law “public policy doctrine” prevents
organizations from qualifying for tax-exempt status as charities if their charitable pur-
poses are illegal or contrary to a well-established, fundamental public policy.  Because
marijuana sales are still illegal under federal law, the public policy doctrine acts as an
absolute bar to exemption as a charity under § 501(c)(3).
Id. (footnote omitted); see also Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 591 (1983).
247. Leff, supra note 128, at 558.
248. Id. at 527–28.
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instance, owners would be unable to distribute profits to owners or
managers, lessening opportunities to raise start-up capital.249  Moreo-
ver, according to Kris Hermes of the Americans for Safe Access,
“[T]he IRS will refuse to grant tax-exempt status to a business that the
agency believes is violating federal law.  Perhaps, it would be possible
for a [retailer] to obtain 501(c)(4) status under false pretenses, but
such status would not very likely withstand an IRS audit.”250
Whether it is by an act of Congress, agency discretion, or even inno-
vative thinking by law school professors, something has to give to al-
low state-sanctioned marijuana retailers to distinguish themselves
from illegal drug traffickers.  Though there is no constitutional bar
preventing the federal government from employing the tax code dis-
criminatorily against state-sanctioned marijuana businesses, fairness
alone demands a remedy given the Obama Administration’s nonen-
forcement policy251 and given that § 280E was enacted long before
marijuana was legalized in the states.252  Framing the issue in the con-
text of fairness might be the only way to garner enough congressional
support for a proposed exception to § 280E for marijuana retailers in
states where sales are legal,253 or for the IRS to decide unilaterally to
not enforce § 280E.254
V. CONCLUSION
This Comment urges the federal government to alter existing bank-
ing and tax laws if it refuses to enforce the Controlled Substances
Act’s marijuana prohibition and instead allows states to offer recrea-
tional marijuana for sale.  Though criminal prosecution is perhaps the
most potent weapon for undercutting state marijuana laws,255 such ac-
tion has been unnecessary due to the Obama Administration’s deci-
sion to exercise “broad discretion” in prosecuting violations of the
CSA.  Despite opposition to and frustration with this nonenforcement
249. Id. (“A § 501(c)(4) marijuana seller also would have to refrain from distributing its prof-
its to any managers or owners; it may have to limit the amount of campaign-related political
activities it engages in; and it may have to operate in a less ‘commercial’ manner than ordinary,
for-profit marijuana sellers.”).
250. Walker, supra note 193.
251. See Cole Memorandum, supra note 6, at 2.
252. See Green, supra note 129.
253. See Small Business Tax Equity Act of 2013, H.R. 2240, 113th Cong. (2013).
254. See Samuel D. Brunson, Watching the Watchers: Preventing I.R.S. Abuse of the Tax Sys-
tem, 14 FLA. TAX REV. 223, 227 (2013) (“[W]here no taxpayer suffers from direct harm, nothing
in the tax law prevents the I.R.S. from misinterpreting or ignoring the law as written.”).
255. TODD GARVEY & BRIAN T. YEH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43034, STATE LEGALIZA-
TION OF RECREATIONAL MARIJUANA: SELECTED LEGAL ISSUES 21 (2013), available at http://
brian.carnell.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/ddbdc9e7fc44f0c30cefa14643d7fd7c.pdf.
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policy, it seems unlikely that a completely prohibitive marijuana re-
gime will reacquire vigor prior to 2016.  Therefore, congressional re-
form of federal banking and tax regulations is necessary for states to
implement safe and well-regulated marijuana markets.
Currently, state-licensed marijuana stores are systematically denied
access to banking services due to marijuana’s classification as a Sched-
ule I substance.256  Financial institutions, unwilling to lose FDIC cov-
erage or risk federal drug-racketeering charges, refuse to service
marijuana retailers, leaving them without bank accounts and forced to
conduct cash-only business.257  Moreover, the current tax code dis-
courages the creation of legitimate businesses, first, by penalizing ma-
rijuana business owners who are forced to pay employee-withholding
taxes in cash; and second, with § 280E, enacted fourteen years before
the legalization movement began,258 which specifically targets mari-
juana retailers by preventing them from deducting business expenses,
while affording the same tax breaks to prostitutes and contract kill-
ers.259  Consequently, its punitive application is not only outrageous,
but encourages tax evasion and black market sales.260
The implications of the Obama Administration’s failure to amend
current banking and tax regulations is the equivalent of actually en-
forcing the CSA; therefore, there is no feasible way for states to com-
ply with the DOJ’s stated objectives in the Cole Memorandum,261 and
thus they may become subject to federal prosecution.  The 2013 Cole
Memorandum requires that states impose effective regulatory
frameworks to control marijuana sales, highlighting the need to ad-
dress public safety concerns and discourage underground traffick-
ing.262  Such an endeavor will ultimately fail without access to
financial services and without incentivizing state-sanctioned busi-
nesses to practice transparency.  In light of the current national trend
favoring legalization,263 and given the amount of potential revenue at
256. See Kovaleski, supra note 165, at A1.
257. See Grim & Reilly, supra note 108.
258. See Green, supra note 129.
259. See Leff, supra note 128, at 533.
260. See Matthews, supra note 213.
261. See Cole Memorandum, supra note 6, at 1–2.
262. See id.
263. See Ray Sanchez & Michael Martinez, Colorado Pot Law Called Springboard for Other
States, CNN (Jan. 6, 2014, 10:29 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/01/03/us/marijuana-laws-united-
states/.
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stake,264 the time is now for the federal government to choose—en-
forcement or reform.
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